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We study a symmetric free entry oligopoly in which firms produce differentiated
goods so as to maximize their relative profits. The relative profit of each firm is the
difference between its profit and the average of the profits of other firms. We show
that whether firms determine their outputs or prices, the equilibrium pricewhen firms
maximize their relative profits is lower than the equilibrium price when firms maxi-
mize their absolute profits, but the equilibrium number of firms under relative profit
maximization is smaller than the equilibrium number of firms under absolute profit
maximization. This is because each firm is more aggressive and produces larger
output under relative profit maximization than under absolute profit maximization.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused the interest of
economists1.
atsato@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
yasuhito@mail.doshisha.ac.jp
1For analyses of relative profit maximization see Gibbons andMurphy (1990), Lu (2011), Matsumura, Matsushima
and Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), (2014), Schaffer (1989), Tanaka (2013a), (2013b) andVega-Redondo
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In Vega-Redondo (1997) it was shown that the equilibrium in an oligopoly with a homo-
geneous good under relative profit maximization is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium.
Referring to Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) he argued that it is relative rather than ab-
solute performance which should in the end prove decisive in the long run. With differentiated
goods, however, the equilibrium in an oligopoly under relative profit maximization is not equiv-
alent to the competitive equilibrium. In Tanaka (2013a) it was shown that under the assumption
of linear demand and cost functions when firms in a duopoly with differentiated goods maximize
their relative profits, the Cournot equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium are equivalent. Satoh
and Tanaka (2014a) extended this result to an asymmetric duopoly in which firms have different
cost functions. Satoh and Tanaka (2013) showed that in a Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous
good under relative profit maximization and quadratic cost functions there exists a range of the
equilibrium price, and this range is narrower and lower than the range of the equilibrium price
in duopolistic equilibria under absolute profit maximization shown by Dastidar (1995). Tanaka
(2013b) showed that under relative profit maximization the choice of strategic variables, price or
quantity, is irrelevant to the equilibrium of duopoly with differentiated goods2.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the nature of human. Even if a
person earns a big money, if his brother/sister or close friend earns a bigger money than him, he is
not sufficiently happy and may be disappointed. On the other hand, even if he is very poor, if his
neighbor is more poor, he may be consoled by that fact. Also firms in an industry not only seek to
improve their own performances but also want to outperform the rival firms. TV audience-rating
race and market-share competition by breweries, automobile manufacturers, convenience store
chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in Japan, are examples of such behavior of firms.
In this paper we study a symmetric free entry oligopoly in which firms produce differentiated
goods so as to maximize their relative profits. The relative profit of each firm is the difference
between its profit and the average of the profits of other firms. We show that whether firms de-
termine their outputs or prices, the equilibrium price when firms maximize their relative profits
is lower than the equilibrium price when firms maximize their absolute profits, but the equilib-
rium number of firms under relative profit maximization is smaller than the equilibrium number
of firms under absolute profit maximization. This is because each firm is more aggressive and
produces larger output under relative profit maximization than under absolute profit maximiza-
tion. Also we show that Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under relative profit maximization are
equivalent.
An equilibrium of a free entry oligopoly is defined as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
following two stage game.
1. There are many potential firms. In the first stage of the game each firm determines whether
to enter or not to enter into the industry. If a firm does not enter, its absolute profit is zero.
(1997). In the analysis of delegation problem such as Miller and Pazgal (2001) the weight on the relative profit
is treated as a means of the owner of a firm to control its firm, and the owner’s objective itself is still the absolute
profit of its firm. But in this paper we have an interest in the case where the owners of firms themselves seek to
maximize the relative profits.
2Usually the relative profit of a firm in a duopoly or an oligopoly is defined as the difference between the absolute
profit of this firm and the absolute profit of the rival firm (or the average of the absolute profits of the rival firms).
Alternatively we can define the relative profit as the ratio of the profit of a firm to the total profit in the industry.
In Satoh and Tanaka (2014b) we compare these two definitions in a duopoly.
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2. In the second stage each firm, which has entered in the first stage, determines the output
or the price of its good.
In the next section we present the model, in Section 3 we analyze Cournot and Bertrand equi-
libria under relative profit maximization, and in Section 4 we compare relative and absolute profit
maximization.
2 The model
There are n firms (n = 2). The firms produce differentiated substitutable goods. The output and
the price of the good of Firm i; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng are denoted by xi and pi . The marginal cost
c > 0 is common. There is a fixed cost f > 0, which is also common to all firms.
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by the firms are
pi D a   xi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (1)
where a > c and 0 < b < 1. b is a substitution parameter. The larger the value of b is, the more
substitutable the goods are. These inverse demand functions are symmetric.
By symmetry we can assume that all xj for all j ¤ i are equal at any equilibrium. Differen-
tiating (1) with respect to pi yields
1 D  @xi
@pi
  .n   1/b @xj
@pi
;
and
0 D  b @xi
@pi
  1C .n   2/b@xj
@pi
:
Then, we obtain
@xi
@pi
D   1C .n   2/b
1C .n   2/b   .n   1/b2 ; (2)
and
@xj
@pi
D b
1C .n   2/b   .n   1/b2 ; j ¤ i:
Thus,
@xi
@pi
  @xj
@pi
D   1C .n   1/b
.1   b/1C .n   1/b D  
1
1   b (3)
3 Relative profit maximization
3.1 Cournot equilibrium
The absolute profit of Firm i is written as
i D .a   xi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj /xi   cxi   f; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
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We denote the relative profit of Firm i byi . It is written as follows,
i Di   1
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
j D a   xi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj   cxi   f
  1
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
fa   xj   b
nX
kD1;k¤j
xk   cxj   f g:
The condition for maximization ofi with respect to xi is
a   2xi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj   c C b
n   1
X
jD1;j¤i
xj D 0:
By symmetry, we can assume that all xi ’s are equal. Then, this equation is rewritten as
a   2C .n   1/bxi   c C b
n   1.n   1/xi D a   2C .n   2/bxi   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs and prices are
QxCi D
a   c
2C .n   2/b ;
and
QpCi D
.1   b/aC 1C .n   1/bc
2C .n   2/b :
C indicates Cournot.
3.2 Bertrand equilibrium
The absolute profit of Firm i is written as
i D .pi   c/xi   f; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
The relative profit of Firm i ,i , is written as follows,
i D i   1
n   1
nX
jD1;j¤i
j
D .pi   c/xi   f   1
n   1
X
jD1;j¤i
.pj   c/xj   f ;
The condition for maximization ofi with respect to pi is
xi C .pi   c/@xi
@pi
  1
n   1
X
jD1;j¤i
.pj   c/@xj
@pi
D 0:
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By symmetry, we can assume that all @xj
@pi
’s for j ¤ i are equal, and all pi ’s are equal. Then,
this equation is rewritten as
xi C .pi   c/

@xi
@pi
  @xj
@pi

D 0: (4)
Substituting (3) into (4), we get
xi   fa   1C .n   1/bxi   cg 1C .n   1/b
.1   b/1C .n   1/b (5)
D xi   a   1C .n   1/bxi   c
1   b D 0:
The equilibrium outputs and prices are obtained as follows,
QxBi D
a   c
2C .n   2/b ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
and
QpBi D
.1   b/aC 1C .n   1/bc
2C .n   2/b ; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng: (6)
B indicates Bertrand. We have QxBi D QxCi and QpBi D QpCi . Thus, when firms maximize their
relative profits, Cournot and Bertrand equilibria are equivalent.
We denote the equilibrium output and price of the good of each firm under relative profit
maximization by Qxi and Qpi .
The equilibrium profit of each firm is expressed by
i D . Qpi   c/
2
1   b   f D .1   b/ Qx
2 D .1   b/.a   c/
2
2C .n   2/b2   f:
The condition for free entry of firms, ignoring integerness of the number of firms, is
.1   b/.a   c/2
2C .n   2/b2 D f; (7)
or
. Qpi   c/2
1   b D f; (8)
or
.1   b/ Qx2i D f:
Therefore, the equilibrium output and price of the good of each firm are as follows
Qxi D
r
f
1   b ;
and
Qpi D
p
.1   b/f C c:
Solving (7) for n, we get
Qn D .a   c/
p
.1   b/f   2.1   b/f
bf
:
Qn denotes the equilibrium number of firms in the case of relative profit maximization.
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Some discussions Comparing the first order conditions for relative profit maximization in
the Cournot oligopoly and those in the Bertrand oligopoly, we can provide the reason why these
results hold. At the Cournot equilibrium all xi ’s are equal, and then the first order conditions are
reduced to
a   2C .n   2/bxi   c D 0: (9)
The first order condition at the Bertrand equilibrium, (5), is rewritten as
a   2C .n   2/bxi   c C .n   1/ba   2C .n   2/bxi   c D 0: (10)
Since .n   1/b C 1 ¤ 0, (10) implies (9). This is because
@j
@xi
D  @i
@xi
D  fa   2C .n   2/bxi   ci g
at the equilibrium of a symmetric oligopoly.
4 Comparison between relative profit maximization and
absolute profit maximization
4.1 Cournot equilibrium under absolute profit maximization
The condition of absolute profit maximization for Firm i xi is
a   c   2xi   b
nX
jD1;j¤i
xj D 0; i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng:
The equilibrium outputs, prices and profits of the firms are
xCi D
a   c
2C .n   1/b ;
pCi D
a   c
2C .n   1/b C c;
and
Ci D

a   c
2C .n   1/b
2
  f:
C indicates Cournot. The condition for free entry of firms, ignoring integerness of the number
of firms, is 
a   c
2C .n   1/b
2
D f; (11)
or
.xCi /
2 D f;
or
.pCi   c/2 D f:
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Solving (11) for n, we get
nC D .a   c/
p
f   .2   b/f
bf
:
nC denotes the equilibrium number of firms at the Cournot equilibrium under absolute profit
maximization. Also we have
pCi D
p
f C c;
and
xCi D
p
f :
4.2 Bertrand equilibrium under absolute profit maximization
(2) holds also in the case of relative profit maximization. Then, the condition of absolute profit
maximization for Firm i with respect to pi is
xi C .pi   c/@xi
@pi
D xi   .pi   c/ 1C .n   2/b
1C .n   2/b   .n   1/b2 D 0:
The equilibrium outputs, prices and profits of the goods of the firms are
xBi D
1C .n   2/b.a   c/
1C .n   1/b2C .n   3/b ;
pBi D
.1   b/.a   c/
2C .n   3/b C c;
and
Bi D

1C .n   2/b
1C .n   1/b

.pBi   c/2
1   b   f:
B indicates Bertrand. The condition for free entry of firms, ignoring integerness of the number
of firms, is
.1   b/1C .n   2/b.a   c/2
1C .n   1/b2C .n   3/b2 D f; (12)
or
.xBi /
2 D 1C .n   2/b
.1   b/1C .n   1/bf;
or
.pBi   c/2 D
.1   b/1C .n   1/b
1C .n   2/b f:
Denote the number of firms which satisfies (12) by nB . It is the equilibrium number of firms at
the Bertrand equilibrium under absolute profit maximization. Also we have
pBi D
s
1C .nB   1/b
1C .nB   2/b.1   b/f C c;
and
xBi D
s
1C .nB   2/b
1C .nB   1/b

f
1   b

:
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4.3 Comparison of the equilibrium prices
Comparing Qpi with pBi
Qpi   pBi D
p
.1   b/f  
s
1C .nB   1/b
1C .nB   2/b

.1   b/f ;
Since 1C.nB 1/b
1C.nB 2/b > 1, we have Qpi   pBi < 0.
Comparing pBi with p
C
i ,
pBi   pCi D
s
1C .nB   1/b
1C .nB   2/b

.1   b/f  
p
f :
Since "
1C .nB   1/b
1C .nB   2/b
#
.1   b/   1 D  .n
B   1/b2
1C .nB   2/b < 0;
we have pBi   pCi < 0.
Therefore, we have shown
Qpi < pBi < pCi :
4.4 Comparison of the equilibrium numbers of firms
Compare Qn with nB . The equation for the equilibrium number of firms in the Bertrand oligopoly
under absolute profit maximization is a cubic equation, and its closed-form solution is very com-
plicated. So, implicit comparison is appropriate. Assume that the number of firms at the Bertrand
equilibrium under absolute profit maximization and that at the Bertrand equilibrium under abso-
lute profit maximization are equal. Then, from (7) and (12), we have
.1   b/1C .n   2/b
1C .n   1/b2C .n   3/b2  
1   b
2C .n   2/b2 > 0: (13)
Since 1 b
2C.n 2/b2 is a decreasing function of n, (13) means that the equilibrium number of firms
under relative profit maximization is smaller than that at the Bertrand equilibrium under absolute
profit maximization.
Compare nC and nB . Assume that the number of firms at the Cournot equilibrium and that
at the Bertrand equilibrium under absolute profit maximization are equal. Then, from (11) and
(12) we have 
1
2C .n   1/b
2
  .1   b/1C .n   2/b
1C .n   1/b2C .n   3/b2 > 0: (14)
Since 1 b
2C.n 1/b2 is a decreasing function of n, (14) means that the equilibrium number of firms
at the Cournot equilibrium under absolute profit maximization is larger than that at the Bertrand
equilibrium under absolute profit maximization. Therefore, we have shown
Qn < nB < nC :
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4.5 Comparison of the equilibrium outputs per firm
Comparing Qxi with xBi
Qxi   xBi D
r
f
1   b  
s
1C .nB   2/b
1C .nB   1/b

f
1   b

:
Since 1C.nB 2/b
1C.nB 1/b < 1, we have Qxi   xBi > 0.
Comparing xBi with x
C
i ,
xBi   xCi D
s
1C .nB   2/b
1C .nB   1/b

f
1   b

 
p
f :
Since "
1C .nB   2/b
1C .nB   1/b
#
1
.1   b/   1 D
.nB   2/b2
1C .nB   1/b > 0;
we have xBi   xCi > 0.
Therefore, we have shown
Qxi > xBi > xCi :
Summarizing the results,
Proposition 1. Whether firms determine their outputs or prices,
1. the equilibrium price when firms maximize their relative profits is lower than the equilib-
rium price when firms maximize their absolute profits;
2. The equilibrium number of firms under relative profit maximization is smaller than the
equilibrium number of firms under absolute profit maximization;
3. The equilibrium output per firm under relative profit maximization larger than the the
equilibrium output per firm under absolute profit maximization.
The reason why the equilibrium number of firms under relative profit maximization is smaller
than that under absolute profit maximization is to be that each firm is more aggressive and pro-
duces larger output under relative profit maximization than under absolute profit maximization.
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